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Abstract: This article examines the European response to complex financial crises. In 
particular it traces the debate on the revision of the financial services supervision, and 
demonstrates a major and abrupt shift in European financial governance with regard to 
two very important dimensions of every regulatory system: the locus and form of 
institutionalization (where the EU underwent a shift from a decentralized and network-
based to a centralised and institutionalised regime), and the regulatory approach 
(where the EU embraces harmonization and standardisation after decades of support 
for mutual recognition).  To illustrate these substantial shifts we conduct longitudinal 
qualitative content analysis of the European Council’s Presidency Conclusions from the 
start of the 1990s to 2013, and we study the position papers presented by banks and 
banking associations in the so-called De Larosière consultation round of 2009 (which 
determined the future of financial services supervision in the EU). In the aftermath of 
the crisis, we find surprising consensus for both: support for central institutions and 
harmonization.  
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1. Introduction 
 
The public policy literature has shown that crises can trigger institutional and policy 
change in issue areas ranging from food and environmental safety to urban planning and 
counter-terrorism (Birkland, 2006; Boin et al., 2008; Boin et al., 2013b). In the aftermath 
of the 2008 global financial crisis, financial sector governance has received more 
scrutiny from decision-makers, practitioners, and academics. In the European Union 
(EU), we observe a changing institutional landscape such as the creation of three 
European Supervisory Authorities (ESAs) in banking, securities and insurance as well as 
the delegation of new tasks to the European Central Bank (ECB) (Howarth and Quaglia, 
2013, 2014; Moschella and Tsingou, 2013). In particular, there has been a shift from the 
looser and more decentralized model of policy coordination at the EU level introduced 
in the early 2000s to a more centralized governance architecture after the 2008 global 
financial crisis and the subsequent Eurozone sovereign debt crisis (Spendzharova, 
2014). 
In analysing crises as a driver of institutional change, Kingdon (1995: 94) argued 
that windows of opportunity are opened by ‘focusing events’ such as natural disasters or 
crisis or by events in the political realm such as a new government coming to power (see 
also Zahariadis, 2007: 69; Ackrill et al., 2013). Indeed, scholars have shown the 
vulnerability of the European financial regulation system to global financial turmoil 
(Lannoo, 2008; Moshirian, 2011; Ferran, 2012). Currently, it is widely accepted that the 
global financial crisis impacted on European policy change in the financial sector, and 
that financial regulation has been ‘supranationalized’ or ‘Europeanized’ (Mügge, 2013a). 
These developments seem indisputable in the aftermath of the financial turmoil, but 
they are far from ‘natural’ given the path of financial regulation the EU has followed 
throughout the 1990s and in the first half of the 00s. Assessing the governance 
arrangements prior to the crisis, Tsingou (2009: 3) observes transnationalised and 
informal network governance that “gradually came to reflect private sector interests and 
preferences”. Similarly, Mügge (2013b: 208) observes “dislocation of regulatory debates 
away from national capitals towards transgovernmental networks” of like-minded 
experts. The issues discussed in these networks were technical, not salient and 
according to Tsingou (2009: 5) were viewed as “apolitical, with regulators and 
supervisors aligned with market participants.” 
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The second major characteristic of the pre-crisis regulatory regime was that 
mutual recognition was advocated as the appropriate regulatory approach by the 
private actors involved. According to Mügge (2013b: 9) the London City banks – key 
players in the above-mentioned networks – were claiming that “pan-European mutual 
recognition of home country rules and abolition of ‘cumbersome’ regulation is the way 
forward”. This view of the private sector – often depicted as ‘negative integration’ – was 
dominant over the Commission’s argument for a set of harmonized rules (i.e. ‘positive 
integration’). Harmonization was seen as unnecessary red-tape (Mügge, 2013b: 209). In 
sum, the pre-crisis debate was characterized by transnational standard-setting via 
decentralized apolitical networks that preferred the regulatory vision of mutual 
recognition. How did the crisis of 2008 influence the debate about the institutional 
reforms in European financial sector regulation? 
 
This paper looks at the shifting governance framework in the financial sector and aims 
to trace how the two principles of decentralisation and mutual recognition lent their 
dominating position to new arguments and frames in the aftermath of the global 
financial crisis. The main objective is to examine how financial regulation and 
supervision has been conceptualised for the purposes of EU public-policy making 
throughout the past 20 years of European integration and to establish the role of the 
2008 financial crisis therein.  
The core questions in this context are the following: How have the frames 
changed especially with regard to institutionalization and regulatory approach, and 
what have been the arguments used to back up these changes? Has the position and 
impact of the most prominent group of stakeholders – the banks and banking 
associations – changed over time and in what direction? In answering these questions, 
we will follow a two-step approach. Firstly, we will map out how the European-wide 
discourse about financial sector regulation and the underlying argumentation changed 
over the last two decades. We will do so via analysing the European Council’s Presidency 
Conclusions (see also Alexandrova et al., 2014; Alexandrova and Timmermans, 2013) 
from the signature of the Maastricht Treaty (1991) until present. This longitudinal 
qualitative content analysis allows us to demonstrate the rather abrupt changes in the 
framing of financial sector regulation during times of crisis (i.e. in 2008/2009), and the 
dynamics in the argument provision. It will be explored how the rhetoric of 
decentralized governance via technical/expert networks and the principle of mutual 
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recognition advocated in the 1990s got abruptly replaced by a discourse of 
supranational institution-building and harmonized rule-setting.  The significant shift is 
hardly surprising when it comes to the public actors and the member states, who would 
naturally aim at eliminating the key characteristics of the regulatory regime that 
allegedly led to the crisis. The position of the private actors on this same issue is far from 
self-evident, however. They have advocated for, and importantly profited from, the 
model of decentralized regulatory competition, especially when it comes to the major 
international banking institutions.  
We thus, in a second step, analyze the positions of the relevant actors in the 
policy subsystem. Financial private sector groups are generally considered to have 
considerable influence on financial sector regulation – largely due to the fact that this 
sector is dominated by highly technical policy-making, and the industry itself easily 
influences the regulators via its specialized expertise (e.g. Pagliari and Young, 2014). 
Next to the asymmetry of information, the resource base of the private sector in the 
financial domain is expected to further facilitate blockage of unwelcome regulatory 
reforms (see Young, 2013). Pre-crisis it was often argued that private sector influence 
led to a weakening of regulatory standards (see Young 2012 for an overview of the 
relevant international political economy literature on this issue). Post-crisis, claims have 
been made that private sector influence declined due to a decline in credibility. In the 
second part of the empirical investigation we analyze the private sector contributions to 
the debate on the future of the EU financial sector reform (the so-called De Larosière 
process from 2009). To what extent do we witness such a blockage of change and 
assertion of the principles of decentralization and mutual recognition in the 
contributions to online consultations? Based on the findings about dominant frames and 
changing argumentation framing at the European level, what can be concluded about the 
stance of the private sector on the regulatory debate after 2008?  
 
2. The changing European-wide policy discourse about financial sector regulation  
 
2.1  How to analyse the changing discourse?  
 
The change in European-wide frames about financial sector regulation is illustrated via 
examining longitudinally the changing policy discourse in the European Council. This 
level of analysis is chosen because the European Council is the strategic decision-making 
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body of the EU that sets the policy priorities and negotiates the (re)design of the EU 
institutions in all policy domains. This is the arena for intergovernmental bargaining 
between the Member States (the principals) – an arena that sets the subsequent 
framework (manoeuvring space) for the activities of the EU institutions (the agents). 
The Presidency Conclusions (PCs) produced after every European Council summit are 
the materialization of the discourse of the principles. The PCs are rich and indispensable 
sources for the governance scholar because they state not only the approved decision 
but also the motivations of the member states in empowering or curbing the influence of 
the EU institutions. By plotting these motivations and the articulated claims (for the 
same or more enhanced supranational institutionalization) we will be able to establish 
when and how the policy dynamics developed.  
In order to establish this empirically, we coded all PCs from the signature of the 
Maastricht treaty (1991) until present for the statements regarding regulation of the 
European financial markets. The longitudinal qualitative content analysis allows for a 
thorough delineation of the framing process and the discursive shifts in the decision-
making process. The year 1991 is taken as a start because it marks the endorsement of 
the plan for an Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), which would spur discussions 
about the most appropriate scope, venue and level of institutionalisation of European 
financial regulation. Coding the Presidency Conclusions back to 1991 allows us to 
capture all significant institutional changes. Moreover, a longitudinal analysis of more 
than 20 years gives us sufficient scope to capture both incremental and abrupt 
discursive shifts. 
 
The empirical analysis distinguishes two units of analysis: claims and argumentation. 
Claims indicate a preferred policy outcome, and can be identified by notions such as: 
“we welcome / approve / support / appreciate / anticipate…” a particular type of 
institutionalised financial regulation. In order to get a more nuanced and thorough 
understanding of the discourse on financial regulation, a second unit of analysis is 
introduced, namely argumentation. Argumentation refers to the stated reasons, 
objectives and goals that back the claim-making. For example, a claim such as increased 
institutionalisation at the EU level of governance can be backed by several arguments 
such as assuring consistency and transparency of the regulatory regime, greater 
financial stability, and reaping the full benefits of the Single Market. Such arguments are 
judgements about the existing policy ‘reality’, highlighting that it apparently lacks 
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sufficient consistency, transparency, stability. Importantly, the discursive linkage 
between claims and arguments is not unique and can occur in various combinations. 
  Each PC was read and interpreted for all statements regarding regulation of 
financial markets in Europe. When a claim is identified, it is recorded in the research 
protocol as one occurrence.1 Usually, one claim per paragraph is coded. However, if the 
same claim is stated in several lines within the same paragraph, it is coded and 
protocoled as many times as it is articulated since the repetition demonstrates emphasis 
and assertion. The same goes for the annexes. Annexes are coded and if the annex 
contains a statement regarding financial regulation it is added as a ‘regular’ occurrence.  
  The procedure for arguments is identical, only bearing in mind that throughout 
the same paragraph various arguments may be raised. So, unlike with claims, it is 
important to note that the same paragraph can contain different lines of argumentation. 
For example, it can be said that a more integrated financial market is needed to ensure 
financial stability and to foster growth. Moreover, the discursive linkage between claims 
and arguments is not unique and can occur in various combinations. A claim can be 
backed-up by several arguments, and the same argument can be used in the articulation 
of several claims. This clarification is necessary because, as will be revealed in the 
empirical section below, the same argumentation such as reaping the benefits of the 
EMU may lead to very different claim-making – respectively for decentralized or more 
centralized institutionalization, depending on the time period. 
 
2.2 From decentralized cooperation to centralization through new institutions 
 
The empirical study begins in 1991 with the Presidency Conclusions of the Luxembourg 
summit of June 1991, based on the assumption that the agreement on EMU in the 
Maastricht Treaty might spur discussions related to the regulation of the European 
financial sector. In practice, however, the first reference to financial sector regulation in 
our dataset occurred in 1998, related to the endorsement of the Financial Services 
Action Plan (FSAP). After 1998, the references to financial sector regulation are regular, 
indicating a continuous policy debate on this issue in the European Council. 
 
 
                                                        
1 This coding technique is similar to the method of political claims analysis (PCA) used in measuring party 
positions by Koopmans and Statham (1999) and Helblin and Tresch (2011). 
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Figure 1 displays the dynamics of claim-making in terms of absolute number of 
references to two dominant claims we identified: 
1. Claim 1 (C1): Cooperation within existing frameworks, for short 
‘Decentralization’. Actors are in favour of more cooperation, yet only within 
existing frameworks in or outside the EU institutional framework. This can be 
identified by empirical references to the approval to improve or reinforce 
existing measures or ensure a proper implementation of the European Financial 
Service Action Plan2 (FSAP) for example. 
2. Claim 2 (C2): Centralization through new EU institutions. Actors are in favour of a 
common regulatory approach, yet claim that a new institution at EU level is 
required in order to create a well-functioning and integrated financial market. 
Empirical references are expected to entail notions such as ‘new architecture’, 
‘new approach’ and indicate the introduction of new institutionalized 
mechanisms such as the EFSF or SSM (Single Supervisory Mechanism) or EBU 
(European Banking Union).  
Figure 1 indicates two periods in the discourse regarding financial regulation in the 
European Council: a first peak is observed between 1998 and 2004, associated with 
support for looser decentralized cooperation. In the years 2005-2008, there were only 
few claims expressed in Presidency Conclusions (PCs). While financial regulation was 
not on the agenda between 2005 and 2008, it suddenly came back in the discussion after 
the onset of the global financial crisis. As of 2009 a new peak is observed, but this time 
the discourse emphasises centralization of financial regulation and the creation of new 
EU institutions. 
 
  
                                                        
2 The Financial Services Action Plan (FSAP) from 1999 is the first overarching policy at the EU level in the 
realm of financial markets and services. Its main aim was to complete the single market in financial 
services through harmonizing legislation and regulatory practice across the member states i.e. it asserts 
the financial regulatory framework of decentralised coordination in Europe. 
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Figure 1: Overview of the claims regarding the institutionalization of financial regulation 
in the EU (1991-2014)  
 
 
The next finding displayed on Figure 1 concerns the frequency of claim-making which 
can be considered as a crude measure of policy salience. During the first peak (1998-
2004) there are on average 3 references to decentralization per year, while during the 
second peak (2009-2014) not only does C2 replace the claim for decentralised 
cooperation (C1) but the intensity of claim-making is much higher – on average 8 per 
year. To summarise, we observe significant and abrupt shift in the discursive landscape 
from C1 to C2, and very outspokenly so: if the average claim-making per year amounted 
to 2 references until 2008, in 2009 the claim-making peaked at 10 (even to 16 
references in 2012). 
 
How can these discursive shifts be interpreted? One direct observation is that both 
peaks follow the outbreak of a financial crisis: the Russian crisis of 1998 and the global 
financial crisis in 2008. For a chronology of events and the milestones in EU financial 
regulatory governance see Figure 2. 
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Figure 2: Chronological overview of crisis episodes and major EU financial sector policy 
reforms 
 
The Russian financial crisis clearly focused the attention of the European Heads of State 
and Government in December 1998, and this is when we find the first reference to 
financial regulation in PCs: 
“The European Council had an in-depth discussion on the situation in Russia. 
…… It stresses the Union's solidarity with Russia and its people during the 
present economic crisis. That crisis is multi-faceted. So too must be the 
response of the EU and the rest of the international community.” (PC Vienna, 
December 1998). 
As visible from the excerpt below, concerns are expressed about the management 
of risk but the envisioned follow-up is within the existing (international) financial 
institutions: 
“Consideration should be given to the strengthening and/or transformation of 
the Interim and Development Committees of the IMF and the World Bank. The 
European Council emphasises the necessity of strengthening the regulatory 
focus on risk management and prudential standards in financial sector 
institutions…” (PC Vienna, December 1998). 
These quotes indicate that there is a temporal association between the Russian financial 
crisis of 1998 and the first discussion in the European Council (EC) regarding risk 
management and financial regulation. Moreover, the crisis seems to have generated the 
needed consensus for the reinforcement of the on-going plans for completion of the 
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Single Market in financial services, because during the same Vienna summit of 1998 the 
European Council called on the Commission to prepare: “a framework for action and the 
establishment of a High-Level Group. It asks for a Council report to the European Council in 
Cologne on the necessary steps towards a single financial market” (PC Vienna, Dec. 1998, 
§51). The Financial Services Action Plan (FSAP) was indeed prepared and presented to 
the Cologne EC in 1999. It covered the period 1999-2005 and was the first overarching 
policy at the EU level in the realm of financial markets and services. Its main aim was to 
complete the single market in financial services through harmonizing legislation and 
regulatory practice across the member states. Due to its slow implementation, in 2000, 
the ECOFIN Council of Ministers appointed an expert committee, chaired by Alexandre 
Lamfalussy, to speed up EU-wide convergence in regulating securities markets. The so-
called Lamfalussy framework was adopted in 2002 after lengthy negotiations between 
the European Commission, Council, and Parliament, and the principles outlined in the 
Lamfalussy report for the securities sector were extended to banking and insurance 
(Lannoo, 2008; Quaglia, 2007). In 2004, the European Commission reviewed the 
Lamfalussy process and engaged in extensive consultations to fine-tune its 
implementation (European Commission, 2005; see also Masciandaro et al., 2009; 
Grossman and Leblond, 2011). Level 3 committees (CEBS, CESR, and CEIOPS) were the 
most innovative institutional feature of the Lamfalussy framework. They were set up to 
foster the exchange of best practices across member states and sectors, and facilitate 
regulatory convergence (European Central Bank 2007; Grossman and Leblond, 2011). 
However, they were only authorized to issue non-binding recommendations.  
  All in all, the period of 1998 to 2004 displays intensive rethinking of the EU 
regulatory framework characterised by the principle of decentralization and 
cooperation within the existing institutions. The Russian crisis generated momentum 
and consensus for the endorsement of the FSAP. 
 
The second discursive peak that we observed in Figure 1 displays temporal association 
with the global financial crisis and the subsequent Eurozone sovereign debt crisis. The 
link to the global financial crisis is clear: 
 
“The magnitude and the underlying causes of the ongoing global financial and 
economic crisis demonstrate the need to reshape macroeconomic global 
management and the regulatory framework for financial markets. Prudential 
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rules, crisis management arrangements and the supervisory framework must 
be strengthened at the national, European and global levels” (PC Brussels, 
March 2009). 
 
Noticeably, the European Council gave impetus for more financial regulation but this 
time linked to claims to strengthen the European regulatory framework and, moreover, 
establish new institutions at EU level:  
 
“The European Council also recommends that a European System of Financial 
Supervisors, comprising three new European Supervisory Authorities, be 
established aimed at upgrading the quality and consistency of national 
supervision, strengthening oversight of cross-border groups through the setting 
up of supervisory colleges and establishing a European single rule book 
applicable to all financial institutions in the Single Market” (PC Brussels, June 
2009). 
 
In the aftermath of the 2008 global financial crisis, the European Commission launched a 
new initiative to redesign the European financial architecture following the 
recommendations of another high-level expert group, chaired by Jacques de Larosière 
(see Hodson and Quaglia, 2009; Quaglia, 2010). These reforms envisaged the creation of 
a European Systemic Risk Council (ESRC) that would be in charge of macro-prudential 
supervision – monitoring and assessing systemic risk in European financial markets 
(European Commission, 2009b). A second institution – the European System of Financial 
Supervisors (ESFS) – would complement the ESRC in the area of micro-prudential 
supervision. The ESFS includes three new European supervisory authorities in banking, 
securities, and insurance, which are de facto European agencies (European Commission, 
2009c; Amtenbrink, 2011). 
  The overview of policy events in Figure 2 shows that since the mid-2000s the 
institutionalisation of the financial regulation in the EU progressively involved 
supranational elements and new institutions. It is evident from our data and from the 
historical overview that episodes of crisis were coupled with enhanced cooperation and 
institutionalisation. The discursive shift is abrupt and very outspoken in terms of 
intensity of claim-making. The claim for cooperation within existing institutions (C1) 
that dominated the European Council discussions for a decade (1998-2007) was 
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replaced in 2008 by the claim for a greater role of the supranational EU level (C2). 
Moreover, the timing of the discursive shifts and the follow-up reforms coincide with the 
timing of financial crises (the Russian, the global financial crisis and the Eurozone 
sovereign debt crisis).  
 Confirming Birkland (2006), our analysis indicates that the proximity and 
seriousness of the crisis elicit different types of institutional response. In the 1997-1998, 
the Asian and Russian crises only marginally affected the EU and did not undermine 
confidence in the existing governance architecture. The regulatory reforms endorsed in 
this period such as FSAP and the Lamfalussy framework reflect a more decentralized 
approach.  By contrast, the Eurozone crisis was much deeper, affected multiple member 
states, and threatened the integrity of the Eurozone. It triggered a centralization of 
decision-making, monitoring, and sanctioning competences at the EU level.  
 
When delving more deeply into the arguments provided for both claims, we see that 
three core arguments dominate the scene: 
1. Argument 1 (A1): Spill-Over. This line of argumentation refers to the Single 
European Act (SEA) or the European Monetary Union (EMU) and asserts that 
since the Internal market is already relatively integrated it is only logically that 
this will spill over to financial services. Moreover, the EMU and the Euro as a 
single currency require a common regulation which is therefore the only policy 
to fulfil the aims of a single market.  
2. Argument 2 (A2): Economic benefits. The identified problematic situation of this 
argumentation is that due to regulatory inconsistencies within member states, 
the full benefits of an integrated financial market cannot be gained. Thus, a 
common regulatory framework is needed to gain more efficiency and more 
growth and jobs so that citizens and business can benefit. 
3. Argument 3 (A3): Risk Management. This argument identifies ineffective crisis 
management as the problematic situation. Hence, to ensure financial stability and 
to be able to identify systemic risk and react on market developments, a single 
risk management approach is necessary. Moreover, to avoid crises, an adequate 
supervision and absolute transparency must be ensured.  
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The normalized occurrence3 of these three arguments is displayed in Figure 3. 
 
Figure 3: Relative proportions of arguments for enhanced institutionalization in 
Presidency Conclusions of the European Council (1998-2014) 
  
 
Figure 3 shows that the two peaks in claim-making (see Fig. 1) were backed by 3 main 
arguments: spill-over, i.e. completion of the EMU (A1) was mentioned 13 times in the 
studied period (1998-2014), the economic benefits from a common EU regulatory 
framework (A2) was evoked 14 times, and the necessity for financial stability and 
risk/crisis management (A3) was the most common argumentative line with 47 
references.   
The risk management argument is not only referred to the most. Interestingly, 
this is the main argument for redesign of institutions at the outburst of both crises. The 
spill-over and the economic benefit argument are evoked almost three times less, and 
also later. From a temporal perspective, there seems to be a pattern: the onset of a crisis 
(e.g. the Russian one of 1998 or the global one of 2008) generates intensive claim-
making for greater institutionalization backed-up primarily by risk management 
arguments, once the crisis is ‘tamed’ – argumentation related to economic growth and 
sustainable benefits from an integrated market starts to dominate the discussion. This 
indicates that a crisis has a particular discursive ‘lifecycle’: concerns about systemic 
failure are followed by reassurance and growth, followed by a new critical event and 
                                                        
3 The normalized occurrence indicates the proportion of references to a particular argument within the 
total number of articulated arguments in a given year.  
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new doubts about the robustness of the system, ensued by growth-related 
argumentation, etc.  
  All in all, this exploratory analysis demonstrates that the financial crises of 1997-
1998, 2008, and the Eurozone sovereign debt crisis had a major impact on the change in 
frames deployed in the European Council. Moreover, it was demonstrated how the 
support for decentralised governance structure based on mutual recognition got 
replaced by the argumentation that a systemic and harmonized approach needs to be 
followed in the aftermath of 2008. The next section aims to trace the same 
developments in the debate about the set-up of the EU central institutions for financial 
supervision (the follow-up of the so-called De Larosière report). How do the dominant 
frames in the European Council resonate with the position of the financial industry? 
 
3. What role for the financial private sector in changing frames? 
 
What these first insights do not yet tell us, is how crises play a role in the changing of 
frames. We know from the relevant literature that crises only potentially lead to change, 
but not necessarily. Meijerink (2005: 1074) illustrates how the storm surge of 1953 and 
(near) river floods of 1993 and 1995 in the Netherlands did not lead to radical policy 
reform. Also a case study on New Zealand illustrates that the economic crisis in the 
1980s played an important role, but was in itself not enough to lead to reform 
(Aberbach and Christensen, 2001). Crises do not seem to be a sufficient condition for 
reform to take place: ‘the mere occurrence of an emergency and/or the prevalence of 
crisis discourse in a polity do(es) not guarantee that major policy changes will be made’ 
(Boin et al., 2009: 95; see also Alink et al., 2001).  
  In order for crises to lead to changing frames, and thus to potential policy change, 
we need to analyse the role of the relevant actors in the policy subsystem and their 
strategic use of frames. It is thus important to analyse how the relevant ‘policy 
entrepreneurs’ (as Kingdon, 1995, would call them), or ‘advocacy coalitions’ (as 
Sabatier, 1988, would call them), frame problems and solutions. In this article, we 
concentrate on the private financial actors. The highly globalized nature of the financial 
policy sector is known for ensuring considerable power of private actors: ‘policymakers 
are wary of introducing policies that may disrupt the ‘golden goose’ of financial sector 
accumulation and they are more likely to listen to concerns of financial industry groups’ 
(Pagliari and Young, 2014: 578).  
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The literature has already demonstrated significant disagreements among the EU 
member states about the direction and scope of European banking supervision reform. 
On the one hand, member states such as France, Italy, and Portugal have favored more 
supranational control over banking supervision and transfer of powers from the 
national to the European level. By contrast, member states such as the UK and the Czech 
Republic have been vocally opposed to far-reaching centralization of banking regulation 
and have demanded more national discretion (see Howarth and Quaglia 2013, 2014; 
Hennessy 2014; Spendzharova, 2014).  
In addition to these disagreements among the member states, in order to 
contribute new insights to the literature, in this section we analyze banking sector policy 
contributions to the debate on EU banking supervision reforms after the 2008 global 
financial crisis. Our main data source are the Commission’s stakeholder consultations4 of 
March-April 2009 after the De Larosière report from 25 February 2009 (which outlined 
the future EU supervisory architecture). We focus on online public consultations, 
introduced by the European Commission in 2000 and steadily growing in number since 
(Quittkat, 2011: 658), as we know from the literature that consultations affect how 
regulators think about policy (see Chalmers, 2014). As online consultations are 
generally used for policy proposals that ‘result in substantial economic, environmental 
and/or social impact on a specific sector, have a significant impact on major interested 
parties and represent a major policy reform in one or several sectors’ (Commission, 
2002: 15), they form a solid basis for our analysis of financial sector reform.  
We focus on banks and banking associations, as the financial sector is generally 
considered to have considerable influence over regulatory outcomes due to highly 
technical issues requiring in-depth knowledge of the field and expertise (Pagliari and 
Young, 2014). Before 2008, it was often argued that private sector influence led to a 
weakening of regulatory standards (see Young, 2012). Can the same be claimed for the 
aftermath of the global financial crisis? 
 
The empirical analysis followed the same coding procedure as described in Section 2 
above, where claims and arguments were identified in the consultation submissions of 
banks or banking associations are recorded in an Excel working sheet for further 
                                                        
4 Stakeholder consultations are identified by the interest groups literature as an important repository of 
information about private sector actors’ positions on EU legislation (Eising, 2008; Rasmussen and 
Toshkov, 2013; Chalmers, 2014). 
 16 
calculations of proportions and graphic display. Similarly to the PCs, the position papers 
were screened for preferences regarding the emergence of central institutions for 
financial supervision at the EU level of governance (as opposed to decentralized 
governance arrangement), and for stance on the mutual recognition – harmonization 
regulatory continuum. In the concrete case of the examined consultation round these 
issues could be operationalized or concretely linked to:  
- Support for the creation of the European Systemic Risk Council (ESRC) – a body 
charged with macro-prudential supervision and warning for systemic risks, 
which will be complemented by micro-prudential supervision from the European 
System Financial Supervisors (ESFS);  
- Support for the so-called Single Rulebook – a set of common rules applicable 
across all jurisdictions of the EU i.e. a harmonization instrument proposed by the 
Commission. 
 
From the 116 position papers submitted at the consultation round, 42 belonged to 
private banking sector actors: 9 EU/Transnational Banking Associations, 18 National 
Banking Associations and 15 private banks. There is no explicit disapproval to the ESRC 
proposal in any of the 42 submissions.  What is more, the macro-prudential proposals of 
the De Larosière working group, either cautiously or more openly, are supported. There 
is variation with regard to the addressees and the bindingness of the ESRC warnings, but 
the private banking sector on the whole approves of the proposed centralization: 
 
ING: “ING supports the creation of a new European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB). 
We believe an independent macro-prudential body covering all financial sectors 
could help in identifying potential threats and risks to financial stability that arise 
from macro-economic developments and developments within the financial system 
as a whole. 
…….. 
Regarding the issuing of risk warnings and non-binding recommendations we 
agree that the ESRB should address Member States or groups of Member States 
and supervisors, but not individual institutions to avoid potential issues of 
consumer or market confidence.” 
 
The Luxembourg Bankers’ Association: “Settlement of disagreements between 
 17 
national supervisors 
We welcome the proposal of the Commission. We think that the European 
Supervisory Authorities are the best placed to settle disagreements between 
national supervisors.” 
 
With regard to the analytical dimension harmonization / mutual recognition, as 
exemplified by support for a Single Rulebook, the consensus also covers all 42 cases, and 
is very pronounce (almost no reservations are expressed): 
 
European Association of Cooperative Banks: “We support the development by the 
new ESAs of a single rulebook and agree that they should be tasked with ensuring 
that a single set of harmonised rules and supervisory practices is applied by 
national supervisors." 
 
Intesa Sanpaolo Group Italy: …. it [the Single Rulebook]  would allow firms to 
compete on the basis of the same rules and reduce compliance costs by removing 
the cost of complying with up to 27 different domestic regimes. Moreover, the 
single EU rule book would reduce the possibility of regulatory arbitrage and of 
regulatory competition, which played an important role in creating dangerous 
regulatory aps across market segments, institutions or financial jurisdictions." 
 
In sum, from the excerpts above and the performed analysis of the private banking 
contributions to the online consultation on the De Larosière group proposals displays 
remarkable consolidation and consensus with regard to the two dimensions analysed in 
this paper: emergence of EU agencies for financial supervision, and support for a 
harmonization regulatory approach. 
 
4. Conclusion 
 
While the impact of the global financial crisis on change in EU financial governance has 
generally been acknowledged, this paper aimed to look at the shifting governance 
framework in the financial sector. How have the two principles of decentralisation and 
mutual recognition lent their dominating position to new arguments and frames in the 
aftermath of the global financial crisis? The main objective was to examine how financial 
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regulation and supervision has been conceptualised for the purposes of EU public-policy 
making throughout the past 20 years of European integration and to establish the role of 
the 2008 financial crisis therein.  
 
As a first step, we have analysed how the frames changed especially with regard to 
institutionalization and regulatory approach, and what have been the arguments used to 
back up these changes. The results of the qualitative content analysis of European 
Council’s Presidency Conclusions for the period 1991-2014 show that crises have an 
impact on the claim-making and argumentation about institutional redesign. Depending 
on the proximity and the seriousness of the crisis (cf. Birkland, 2006), the shifting 
preferences of the member states and EU legislative institutions may lead to agreements 
for the transfer of competences and centralization at EU level, as in the case of the 
Eurozone sovereign debt crisis. The policy outcome might, however, also be closer to 
looser forms of decentralized cooperation in European financial regulation as in the case 
of the Russian crisis of 1998 when the impact of the crisis was less severe. 
The Eurozone sovereign debt crisis directly affected the European Council 
discourse both in terms of claim-making and in terms of argumentative dynamics. This 
finding adds new evidence that the 2008 global financial crisis formed a window of 
opportunity for further development and agency empowerment in EU financial sector 
regulation (Spendzharova 2012; Boin et al., 2013; Groenleer et al., 2014). Our results are 
in line with Moshirian’s (2011: 505) conclusion that, globally, since the mid-19th century 
financial crises have led to the emergence of new national, regional and international 
institutions.   
Concretely in the case of the EU after 2008, we observed a shift in two very 
important dimensions of every regulatory system: the locus and form of 
institutionalization and the regulatory approach. With regard to the former, the EU 
underwent a shift from a decentralized and network-based to a centralised and 
institutionalised regime. With regard to the latter, the EU embraced harmonization over 
the approach of mutual recognition. Thus, in the course of less than 5 years a policy 
domain that was guarded from supranationalization since the 1980s got Europeanized 
with the ‘blessing’ of the private sector. As we showed in the second step of this paper – 
where we analysed the position of the most prominent group of stakeholders, the banks 
and banking associations – this financial private sector that used to dominate policy-
making in technical transgovernmental networks and favoured mutual recognition of 
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home country rules, now made way for a 180 degrees change to favouring 
centralization.   
By plotting the temporal and relational evolution of claims and arguments in PCs 
and the consultation submissions from the banking sector, this paper traced the shift in 
dominant frames and displayed the formation of the current discursive support for 
centralised and harmonized approach to financial supervision in the EU. The findings 
corroborate the results from the study of Young (2013) on the US reform of financial 
supervision – that in the post-crisis period banks agree to stricter supervision during the 
agenda-setting and policy formulation (due to the increased issue salience) but 
compensate their approval via delays at the stage of implementation.  
With respect to directions for further research, revealing  such ‘compensatory 
strategy’ by financial institutions operating in Europe could be one of the directions (e.g. 
examination of the De Larosière Review consultation process of 2013). Furthermore, 
now that the EU level of governance has established competences and operates in the 
domain of financial services supervision, it is necessary to examine how this regime 
operates in practice and whether it is indeed capable to cut on red-tape and assure 
prudent financial operations. Another interesting domain to be explored is how policy 
entrepreneurs mobilise and push issues onto the macro-political agenda.  
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